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DOES ORGANIZED CRIME EXIST
IN AFRICA?
STEPHEN ELLIS ANDMARK SHAW*
ABSTRACT
There is increasing international concern about the growth of organized
crime in Africa. Important criminal organizations and professional crim-
inals are present in Africa, but we argue that the term “organized crime” is
not a very useful description of their activity, since what we are actually wit-
nessing is a reformulation of politics and crime into networks that tran-
scend the state/non-state boundary in ways that are hardly subsumed in
standard concepts of organized crime. Similar processes are taking place
in various parts of the world, and thus African countries are not exception-
al in this regard. The process, however, does take particular forms in
Africa that arise out of the histories of individual countries. The article
describes the evolution in countries as diverse as Libya, Guinea-Bissau,
and Zimbabwe of a market for protection, as business people – legitimate
and otherwise – seek protection for their activities and their personnel.
This market for protection is created by making private arrangements,
often with state ofﬁcials working in private capacities. The implications are
profound: they could amount to a new mode of governance connecting
Africa to international markets and institutions in which the distinctions
between licit and illicit economic activity become difﬁcult to detect.
ON 2 APRIL 2013, agents of the United States’ drugs enforcement adminis-
tration arrested on the high seas ﬁve citizens of Guinea-Bissau whom they
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had entrapped in an elaborate sting operation.1 One of the ﬁve was Admiral
José Américo Bubo na Tchuto, chief of the Bissauan navy. A veteran of
Guinea-Bissau’s liberation war against Portugal and a leading ﬁgure in the
country’s armed forces, he had long been suspected by the US authorities
of cocaine trafﬁcking on a massive scale. The ﬁve suspects were taken to the
US, where Bubo na Tchuto pleaded guilty in court to the charges against
him. His trial is currently in progress.
Over the last decade, Guinea-Bissau has become notorious for its partici-
pation in the large-scale import of cocaine from Latin America, particularly
since the publication in 2007 of a report on the subject by the United
Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime.2 Following news of Bubo na Tchuto’s
arrest, there were reports that many of the Latin American and other inter-
national drug trafﬁckers who had based themselves in Guinea-Bissau in
previous years had taken fright and moved to the neighbouring Republic of
Guinea, also known as Guinea-Conakry. There, the drug trade appears still
to be ﬂourishing, as it has done at least since the closing years of the presi-
dency of General Lansana Conte, who died in December 2008. There is
evidence from interviews with law-enforcement ofﬁcers and others that
leading military ﬁgures in these two neighbouring countries, Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau, have conspired to trade drugs internationally for the last
decade at least.3
In describing activities like these, external law-enforcement ofﬁcials often
refer to them as ‘organized crime’. This, however, is a term rarely used by
Africans themselves, with only a few exceptions, such as in South Africa
where it is generally used to describe external rather than domestically
rooted networks. The lack of agreement on vocabulary raises an interesting
set of questions about what organized crime is recognized to be in the
African context, by some observers at least, and whether the term is ever
useful to describe African realities. Our approach is to study the characteris-
tics of some of the activities in Africa that would be included in almost any
deﬁnition of the term, with a view to identifying its speciﬁc features in
African contexts.4 We then proceed to analyse the features of the markets
for criminal protection that have emerged in recent years in Africa and that
1. Richard Valdmanis, ‘U.S. agents seize suspected Bissau drug kingpin at sea’ (Reuters US
edition), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/05/us-bissau-trafﬁckers-idUSBRE93400H
20130405> (25 November 2014).
2. United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Cocaine trafﬁcking in West Africa:
The threat to stability and development (with special reference to Guinea-Bissau) (UNODC,
Vienna, 2001).
3. The authors have made repeated research trips to both countries.
4. We are well aware of the difﬁculties in researching activities that are essentially clandestine,
but we are able to make use of a wide range of publications on comparative crime, for example
in regard to the Sicilian maﬁa, as well as personal interviews with actors on various points of
the spectrum from law breaking to law enforcement.
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have been the subject of study in other contexts.5 We conclude with some
remarks on how this is contributing to the continuing formation of African
states.
The intertwining of crime and state politics in Africa has a genealogy that
can be traced back for at least half a century. Some African countries had
already developed a characteristic style of rule that the sociologist Stanislav
Andreski in 1968 dubbed ‘kleptocracy’, in reference to the systematic use of
fraud, bribery, and similar illegality as instruments of governance.6
Andreski made clear some of the deep social and political roots of this
mode of rule, which can be found in at least some African countries.
However, the emergence of nationalist governments on the continent was
from the outset associated not just with domestic corruption but also with a
distinctive globalized form of rent seeking. In West Africa, for example, as
politicians in search of funds formed alliances with foreign businessmen in
search of contracts, the safeguards that prevented politicians and civil ser-
vants from doing corrupt deals with foreign contractors ‘evaporated in
some instances’7 at an early date. The United Kingdom’s ﬁrst High
Commissioner to Nigeria had ‘no doubt… that foreign ﬁrms are largely to
blame’ in regard to corruption of this sort, just one year after independ-
ence.8 African politicians who took bribes from foreign ﬁrms became vul-
nerable to blackmail, with the result that ‘corruption, foreign inﬂuence, and
domestic politics became hopelessly entangled’.9
As a result of these processes, economies became politicized in a new
and very speciﬁc sense. Also in Nigeria, a young American businessman
who took up a job in 1962 discovered that foreign companies were writing
inﬂated invoices in respect of imported goods as a systematic means of ex-
patriating their proﬁts. ‘Most foreign-owned companies’, he recalled, ‘were
doing largely the same thing.’10 A different model emerged in Africa’s
French-speaking countries, where the development from late colonial times
of a close relationship between foreign businesses and African politicians
formed part of the relationship dubbed ‘Françafrique’ by Côte d’Ivoire’s
long-serving president Félix Houphouët-Boigny–who intended this term to
be understood positively. An evolving feature of Françafrique, which has
transformed it into a pejorative term, has been a complex of Franco-African
5. Federico Varese,Maﬁas on the move: How organized crime conquers new territories (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011).
6. Stanislav Andreski, The African predicament: A study in the pathology of modernisation
(Michael Joseph, London, 1968), p. 109.
7. Henry L. Bretton, Power and politics in Africa (Longman, London, 1973), p. 128.
8. National Archives of the United Kingdom, London, DO 186/10, fol. 37: Head to
Clutterbuck, 5 May 1961; and fol. 56, Head to Clutterbuck, 8 November 1961.
9. Bretton, Power and politics in Africa, p. 129.
10. Raymond Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free-market
system (JohnWiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2005), p. 12.
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corruption overseen by a small and durable circle of ofﬁcials whose centre of
power is in the Elysée palace. A signiﬁcant part of the rents generated has
reportedly been channelled to French politicians and their parties.11 What
these experiences suggest is a complex interweaving of criminal networks
and everyday politics that revolves around the provision of political protection
for illicit activities, a development that we refer to as ‘markets for protection’.
In this article, we aim to determine whether it is accurate to speak of
organized crime in Africa. We investigate how the concept could be made
operational and suggest how else we might describe recent patterns of orga-
nized criminal activity in Africa if it is not appropriate. We believe that the
concept of markets for protection provides a useful analytical grille for
studying the intersection of politics, business, and crime in Africa – one
that we hope will be of use to other researchers in this area.
Understanding crime in Africa
The concept of organized crime emerged in the USA, where it originally
reﬂected the government’s interpretation of traditional patronage networks
among Italian immigrants involved in crime. Since then, the phrases “orga-
nized crime” and “maﬁa” have gained a greater or lesser degree of accept-
ance in many countries, always in circumstances that differ slightly or not
so slightly from one place to another.
The original maﬁa, rooted in Sicily, has been described as ‘a shadow
state, a political body that sometimes opposes, sometimes subverts, and
sometimes dwells within the body of the legal government’.12 Historically,
it developed by supplying protection in situations where the enforcement of
law by the state was inadequate.13 In recent decades the spread of southern
Italian crime networks to new locations has been facilitated by their ability
to exploit a lack of effective law enforcement in parts of northern Italy and
elsewhere in the world where new labour forces have come into existence,
suggesting that a rise in organized criminal activity may be related to the
emergence of new markets.14 In Russia, organized crime groups were rela-
tively unimportant during the heyday of Soviet government but gained
political purchase during the upheavals of the 1980s as enforcers of con-
tracts in new markets.15 ‘What was organized crime in the Soviet Union?’,
11. There is no fully satisfactory summary of la Françafrique, but see Antoine Glaser and
Stephen Smith, Ces Messieurs Afrique (Calmann-Levy, Paris, 2005).
12. John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A history of the Sicilian maﬁa (Palgrave Macmillan, London,
2005), p. 291.
13. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian maﬁa: The business of private protection (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993).
14. Varese,Maﬁas on the move.
15. Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs: The use of force in the making of Russian capitalism
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002).
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asks a leading Russian commentator. ‘At least after Andropov’s time
[1984], it began to be part of the system, under the control of the KGB.
The only people who the bandits were afraid of were the state security ofﬁ-
cers. And this evolved into its present-day form.’16 In Colombia, by con-
trast, organized crime has developed from a strong sense of local and
provincial identity in a historically weak state.17
If we accept that something that can reasonably be called “organized
crime” exists in many places, it is nevertheless apparent that this existence
takes particular forms in various countries. Similar diversity should be
expected in Africa, where patterns of organized criminal activity emerge
from the continent’s own circumstances and history, as indeed they do
everywhere. Arguably these problems emerge from continuities in Africa’s
history, including in the many cases where corruption is embedded, incorp-
orating older practices of gift giving and honour.18 It is also important to
note the consequences of the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s in
forming a new political and economic climate.
We therefore think it advisable not to begin by adopting one of the many
deﬁnitions of organized crime offered by the relevant literature, which is
mainly based on the study of Europe and North America,19 and then
testing its relevance to Africa. While there is no globally agreed deﬁnition of
organized crime, most extant deﬁnitions include reference to the scale of
activities, the degree of permanence and cohesiveness of those involved,
and their propensity to violence. To take one or other deﬁnition as our
point of departure, we believe, will show simply that in almost any African
context there is a wide variety of illicit or “grey” activities that conceivably
could be described as organized crime, without gaining much explanatory
power from our use of that term. We ﬁnd it more productive to study rele-
vant empirical data with a view to ascertaining what the phenomenon under
scrutiny may look like in a variety of locations on the African continent, to
see how it has evolved in recent decades, and to consider how it links to a
wider set of global developments.
Organized criminal activity in African countries has speciﬁc features that
make it possible to situate such activity on a spectrum extending from
16. Kirill Kabanov, head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, as quoted in Charles
Clover, ‘A death retold’, Financial Times, 19 February 2009, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
41f7ac0c-fe26-11dd-932e-000077b07658.html#axzz3Yht9Gibk> (29 April 2015).
17. Manuel Castells, End of millennium, Vol. 3 of The information age: Economy, society,
and culture (Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2000), pp. 202–6.
18. Giorgio Blundo, ‘La corruption et l’état en Afrique vus par les sciences sociales’, in
Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (eds), État et corruption en Afrique: une
anthropologie comparative des relations entre fonctionnaires et usagers (Bénin, Niger, Sénégal)
(Karthala, Paris, 2007), pp. 39–43.
19. Nikos Passas, ‘Introduction’, Organized Crime (Dartmouth Publishing Co., Aldershot,
1995), pp. xiii–xix. The negotiators of the one global United Nations instrument on the
subject could only agree a rather loose deﬁnition of what constitutes an organized crime group.
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state-legitimated to purely private. Many African countries have weak law
enforcement and have experienced a rapid growth of a wide variety of glo-
balized markets in recent years. Organized criminal activity was a late
starter in Africa, for example in the arrival of Russian organized crime
groups in Sierra Leone in the 1980s20 and the transformation of youth
gangs in Cape Town into organized crime groups via their entry into the
drugs trade and their linkages with the apartheid state.21 In all but a
handful of cases, the rise of organized crime in Africa became perceptible at
a time of extensive political and economic change. These particularities
make African countries rather different from many other places where the
concept of organized crime is longer established.
Patterns of law breaking in Africa that reasonably may be considered as
organized crime are not conﬁned to so-called ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states, but
are readily apparent in some of the continent’s middle-income states as
well.22 An example that has been the subject of recent attention is the
extent of operations in Africa by the Sicilian maﬁa, notably in South Africa,
Angola, and Kenya, generally regarded as some of the continent’s most im-
portant countries.23 For the purposes of a macro-analysis, it is legitimate to
consider major criminal activities from a wide variety of African states to-
gether, or at least to compare and contrast them. Some habitual distinctions
seem to lose their incisiveness in the African context, such as that between
organized crime and corruption. As Etannibi Alemika has pointed out, cor-
ruption is simply the objective of the most serious organized criminal
groups in Africa, not a facilitating activity as it is often held to be in the lit-
erature on organized crime elsewhere.24 Even the terms ‘illegal’ or ‘illicit’
may present problems, as there may be no laws in place to regulate activity
that outsiders consider criminal, or alternatively, the state (or actors within
it) may have provided the requisite paperwork to make a speciﬁc activity
legal for bureaucratic purposes. A good example is high-level oil smuggling
in Nigeria, which may make use of genuine ofﬁcial documents procured
from senior state ofﬁcials who are party to a smuggling operation.
20. Robert I. Friedman, Red maﬁya: How the Russian mob has invaded America (Little,
Brown, and Co., New York, NY, 2000), pp. 57–8.
21. Don Pinnock, The brotherhoods: Street gangs and state control in Cape Town (David Philip,
Cape Town, 1984); Irvin Kinnes, From urban street gangs to criminal empires: The changing face
of gangs in the Western Cape (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Monograph No. 48,
2000).
22. Mark Shaw, ‘Transnational organized crime in Africa’, in Jay Albanese and Philip
Reichel (eds), Transnational organized crime: An overview from six continents (Sage, Los Angeles,
CA, 2014), pp. 93–115.
23. See the investigations listed at <http://www.journalismfund.eu/MaﬁaInAfrica> (4 May
2015).
24. This point is made in the opening chapter of Etannibi Alemika (ed.), The impact of orga-
nized crime on governance in West Africa (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2013), p. 25, and also
in personal communications.
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In many parts of Africa where organized criminal activity can be identi-
ﬁed, it is associated with a set of relationships generally involving senior
ﬁgures within the state or important local power brokers, as well as profes-
sional criminals. Organized criminal activity is often concerned with chan-
nelling or directing resource ﬂows from or to African countries over a
period and in an organized way for the purpose of illicit gain. Drug trading,
kidnapping, embezzlement, the large-scale theft of minerals, or other
plainly criminal activities exist on a sustained basis in many parts of Africa,
in both “weaker” and “stronger” states. In the case of fragile states, such
criminal activities seem to be most important if they concern high-value
natural resources – such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) –
or occur on major trafﬁcking routes. In cases like these, trafﬁcking ﬂows
tend to shape politics, as in Libya since 2011.25
Some important elements of organized criminal activity in Africa could
better be subsumed under the term ‘criminal enterprise’,26 as a good deal
of such activity is the work of networks of entrepreneurs who traverse the
boundaries of the public and private and of the legal and illegal sectors. In
the absence of a clear legal framework that is enforced consistently, enter-
prise crime may be considered to entail any activities that commonly would
be considered illegal, and – although we realize that this is a subjective
judgement in itself – that are contrary to what might be considered the
public good. But ‘enterprise crime’ is not an accurate label, either.
In the end, we can ﬁnd no generally accepted term that does justice to
the characteristic ways in which organized criminal activity takes place in
Africa, involving as it does professional criminals, local or foreign, doing
business regularly with state ofﬁcials and politicians and legitimate busi-
nesses, the latter very often headquartered overseas. While an erosion of the
frontiers between politics, crime, and business is detectable in many parts
of the world, the process has at least three speciﬁc features in African coun-
tries. First, their state bureaucracies are often weak. Second, there are strik-
ingly different outcomes depending on whether the key alliances with
organized crime are made at the level of central government (for example
in Zimbabwe) or at provincial level, as in Libya since 2011. Third, the rise
of organized crime in Africa occurred at a relatively late date, towards the
end of the last century, at a time when ﬁnancial globalization was resulting
in vastly increased ﬂows of money and resources.
The question of understanding what organized crime may mean in Africa
is more than an academic exercise. Interventions by the United Nations
25. Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, Illicit trafﬁcking and Libya’s transition: Proﬁts and losses
(United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2014).
26. R. T. Naylor, ‘From underworld to underground: Enterprise crime, “informal sector”
business and the public policy response’, Crime, Law and Social Change 24, 2 (1995–6),
pp. 79–150.
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Security Council in regard to what it calls ‘organized crime in Africa’ have
increased signiﬁcantly in the past decade,27 going from four statements or
resolutions on organized crime in Africa in 2004 to 15 in 2014.28 These
resolutions use the term ‘organized crime’ or ‘illicit trafﬁcking’ to refer to a
diverse array of activities, including drug trafﬁcking, the illicit movement of
natural resources, different forms of environmental crime, and maritime
piracy. If there is one thing all these UN statements have in common it is
that they concern states in conﬂict, or emerging from it. However, since
issues of peace and security are the very reason the Security Council is
examining crime in a speciﬁc country or region, it cannot therefore be
assumed that armed conﬂict is a necessary accompaniment to organized
crime. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the issue of what the United Nations
itself often terms ‘organized crime’ in Africa is of growing interest to inter-
national policy makers, particularly when it concerns ‘weak’ or ‘failed’
states.
International concern is understandable inasmuch as each of the world’s
nearly 200 sovereign states is responsible for promulgating and implement-
ing law within its own territory, and each one enjoys privileges, including
the right to mint currency and to sign treaties or make other legally binding
agreements with other states. State failure, therefore, is a matter of concern
to the international community in its own right – as the Security Council
resolutions demonstrate. State failure is all the more concerning if it has a
relationship, even a weak one, with criminal activity that promotes regional
instability and funds armed conﬂict.29
For their part, the rulers of African states, whether such polities are con-
sidered strong or weak, generally understand very well the importance of
being seen to uphold the rule of law, since this is essential to continuing
international recognition of their sovereignty. This was well articulated by a
Nigerian police chief who in 2004 stated that ‘Nigeria is a distinguished
member of the international community and as such we must, at all times,
conform and be seen to conform with all norms, conventions and rules that
are sine qua non to peaceful living and respectable human co-existence.’30
27. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and Global Initiative Against
Organized Crime, ‘Development responses to organized crime’ (Background paper for the
Development Dialogue, hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, The Hague, 8–9 April 2014).
28. On conﬂict and organized crime in Africa, an important contribution is William Reno,
‘Understanding criminality in West African conﬂicts’, in James Cockayne and Adam Lupel
(eds), Peace operations and organized crime: Enemies or allies? (Routledge, New York, NY, 2011),
pp. 68–83.
29. A review of the evidence ﬁnds that ‘patterns of transnational crime are imperfectly corre-
lated with state weakness’. See Stewart Patrick,Weak links: Fragile states, global threats and inter-
national security (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), p. 12.
30. Interview, Inspector-General of Police Tafa Balogun, Tellmagazine, Lagos, 6 September
2004.
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(Ironically, the same police chief was later jailed for embezzlement.) In
many cases, the theoretical primacy of the rule of law is purely formal, for
political and social reality may actually be formed by patterns of illicit activ-
ity that include smuggling, the formation of militias, and so on. It is there-
fore essential for an understanding of crime in Africa to appreciate the
distinction between the principle of the rule of law and its actual substance,
as only then is it possible to identify the space between the letter of the law
and the reality of political and economic life where people go about their
business.31 As the West Africa Commission on Drugs that was convened by
Koﬁ Annan and chaired by Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo
recently concluded: ‘trafﬁckers can reshape relationships between and
among political and security actors, the citizenry, and the business commu-
nity within and beyond borders’.32
If this is indeed so, it is inappropriate to use the traditional state-versus-
crime distinction in situations where the state may itself be a major player in
organized crime or may have been extensively inﬁltrated by those with a
criminal purpose. Of course, standard deﬁnitions of organized crime do
recognize connections between state and criminal actors, but this is usually
in regard to facilitating activities, as in the case of corruption. While the
term ‘captured states’ has now become more widely used (not least in the
case of Guinea-Bissau, but also globally),33 it is analytically blunt in so far
as it implies that a state is either ‘captured’ or not, whereas in the vast ma-
jority of cases in Africa the reality lies somewhere in-between. That is not to
say that crime does not undercut state capacity, or is not changing the
nature of the state itself – as we argue below – but we nonetheless ﬁnd that
the notion of ‘criminal capture’ implies a set of relationships that is too sim-
plistic to represent what we believe to be occurring. This speaks to the con-
ceptual challenges of drawing a linkage between the phenomena associated
with organized crime in different contexts, and by so doing identifying what
we mean by ‘enterprise crime’ and the protection economies it spawns.
An appreciation of the distinction to be made between the juridical
nature of sovereignty and the frequent absence of effective law enforcement
in social reality34 makes it easier to discern an important feature of orga-
nized criminal activity in Africa, namely the requirement of criminal
31. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou, The criminalization of the state
in Africa (James Currey, Oxford, 1999), pp. 19–22.
32. West Africa Commission on Drugs, Not just in transit: Drugs, the state and society in West
Africa (West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2014), p. 22.
33. Moisés Naím, ‘Maﬁa states: Organized crime takes ofﬁce’, Foreign Affairs 91, 3 (May–
June 2012).
34. Cf. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment:
Juridical statehood in the African crisis’, Journal of Modern African Studies 24, 1 (1986), pp. 1–31;
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations, and the third world
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990).
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entrepreneurs to receive ‘protection’ in a variety of forms and from a variety
of actors. Since the use of protection has always been a deﬁning feature of
maﬁa-type organizations,35 it seems imperative to understand how maﬁa-
style protection is acquired and applied in African contexts today if we are
to analyse correctly the evolving forms of criminal enterprise that blur the
boundary between politics, the state, business, and society. Any business,
whether dealing in licit or illicit goods, requires protection – but in a state
that has lost its monopoly of violence, this cannot be offered as a free public
service by state law-enforcement agencies. The provision of protection in
return for payment may easily become an interface between something that
may be recognizable as ‘traditional’ organized crime (associated with the
ability to inﬂict violence) and activities more easily recognizable as politics
and business. The state, no matter what its strength or form, plays a key
role in regulating and channelling illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows to foreign jurisdic-
tions. In that respect, the state remains inﬂuential even in countries where
the inﬂuence of criminal groups is evident and where the state itself may be
weak institutionally, or have limited control over its territory.
International linkages and global changes
Activities that reasonably could be considered as enterprise crime in Africa
usually have important international linkages. These range from the collu-
sion of major international companies in bribery and corruption36 to the
cooperation of mining companies with unofﬁcial militias in the exploitation
of minerals in the eastern DRC37 and the role of foreign banks – sometimes
major ones – in aiding illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows.38 Given the important role of
foreign companies, as well as of clearly criminal groups such as Latin
American drug trafﬁcking organizations, it is necessary to situate activities
that could be considered as organized crime in Africa within a global
context, especially as there appears to have been a rise in organized crime
35. Gambetta, The Sicilian maﬁa.
36. One example among many is the prima facie collusion of European arms manufacturers
in South Africa’s 1998 arms scandal: Paul Holden and Hennie van Vuuren, The devil in the
detail: How the arms deal changed everything (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2011).
37. This has been documented by UN expert reports on the DRC, such as ‘Letter dated
2009/11/23 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo…’ (S/2009/603,
United Nations, New York), <http://www.un.org<Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2009/603>
(7 June 2014).
38. See, for example, reports on Riggs Bank and Citibank by the US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, <http://www.levin.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2004/0924psireport.pdf> (6 January 2015); United
States Senate, ‘Role of US correspondent banking in international money laundering’ (Paper
S. Hrg. 107–84, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee of
Governmental Affairs, ﬁrst session, Vol. 1 of 5, Washington, DC, 2001).
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worldwide,39 or what might be termed a blurring of distinctions between
politics, organized crime, and business.40
The mingling of state politics, crime, and legitimate business in recent
decades is not a uniquely African development, and some of the causes of
enterprise crime in Africa can be attributed to global changes that have had
comparable effects elsewhere.41 In 1996, the sociologist Stanley Cohen
published an article with the provocative title ‘Crime and politics: Spot the
difference’ that was inspired partly by events in the Balkans at that time.42
Cohen argued that new patterns of wealth seeking allied to political power
were making it more difﬁcult to apply conventional deﬁnitions of crime,
and that politics and crime, rather than being two fairly distinct ﬁelds of ac-
tivity, were becoming inextricably mixed. Not the least of the analytical pro-
blems such situations cause is in knowing how to think about state
institutions in cases where they are themselves deeply implicated in crime,
for, as Cohen wrote elsewhere, the rules of the international system require
that crime and the state be ofﬁcially regarded as distinct and opposed en-
tities. ‘Governments and their agencies do not commit crimes,’ he noted,
‘but only because the criminal law does not take cognisance of them as
criminal actors.’43
Accordingly, it is helpful to list some of the changes in global conditions
that have resulted in some ﬁelds of legitimate activity becoming associated
with crime. An evident starting point is the effect of the end of the Cold
War. At that time, political elites and secret services in the former Soviet
bloc with no ingrained respect for law made common cause with existing
crime barons in a profound reconﬁguration of power.44 The establishment
of markets where none previously existed created opportunities for well-
placed individuals to make huge fortunes overnight.45 Criminal groups are
generally more nimble than government regulators in exploiting new
markets, but in African cases the growth of organized crime is not primarily
because of deﬁciencies in regulation so much as in the willingness of politi-
cians to envisage relationships with professional criminals. However, even
in Western democracies, where respect for law is comparatively stronger,
39. Misha Glenny,McMaﬁa: Crime without frontiers (Bodley Head, London, 2008).
40. Eva Joly, Est-ce dans ce monde-là que nous voulons vivre? (Les Arènes, Paris, 2003), espe-
cially p. 190.
41. See for example, H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (eds), The illicit global economy
and state power (Rowman and Littleﬁeld, London, 1999); Josiah McC. Heyman (ed.), States
and illegal practices (Berg, Oxford, 1999).
42. Stanley Cohen, ‘Crime and politics: Spot the difference’, The British Journal of Sociology
47, 1 (1996), pp. 1–21.
43. Quoted in David O. Friedrichs (ed.), State crime, Vol. 1: Deﬁning, delineating and explain-
ing state crime (Ashgate, Aldershot and Brookﬁeld, VT, 1998), p. 51.
44. Stephen Handelman, Comrade criminal: Russia’s new maﬁya (Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT, 1995).
45. Castells, End of millennium, pp. 183–90.
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the relationship between politics and crime has changed. This is partly
because of the burgeoning cost of political campaigning, which requires
politicians to raise colossal sums of money, thereby causing them to have re-
course to contributions from people or businesses engaged in illegal activity
that are prepared to make large campaign contributions because they
require political protection. Scandals of this sort have occurred in the
United States and other democracies. A technique available to incumbent
politicians especially is to make arrangements with companies that provide
them with slush funds in return for political favours, as has happened in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and some other
European countries.46
Multinational corporations play a key role in the corruption of state ofﬁ-
cials in many countries. As the European colonial empires disappeared
from the map in the mid-twentieth century, prominent national companies
reorganized themselves to do business in the world then emerging. They
lobbied the governments of new states with a view to creating a legal envir-
onment favourable to the requirements of the companies themselves.
Multinational companies or even individual businesspeople could request a
government to formulate laws in return for money or other favours, while
politicians discovered that the legal principle of sovereignty itself could be
used to generate cash. A spectacular example was the Seychelles, where in
1995 the National Assembly amended the constitution in order to open the
way for legislation guaranteeing immunity from criminal prosecution for
any foreign business operator investing a minimum of $10 million in the
islands. The Economic Development Bill proposed immunity from pros-
ecution for all investors meeting these requirements ‘for all criminal pro-
ceedings whatsoever except criminal proceedings in respect of offences
involving acts of violence and drug trafﬁcking in Seychelles’.47
New forms of ﬁnancial globalization have affected commercial and polit-
ical relationships of all descriptions. Measures that have contributed to this
process include market reforms undertaken by the Chinese government
from 1978, the abolition of foreign exchange control in the United
Kingdom in 1979, deregulation and tax cuts enacted by the ﬁrst Reagan ad-
ministration in the USA, the European commitment to creating a single
European market, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and India’s
move away from protectionism in the same year. Beginning in the 1980s,
leading ﬁnancial powers advocated the light regulation of ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and, in this environment, banks in the world’s most developed coun-
tries found methods of marketing debt that were dependent on new
46. A partial list of funding scandals in European countries can be found in Perry Anderson,
‘The Italian disaster’, London Review of Books 36, 10 (2014), pp. 3–5.
47. Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris, Indigo Publications, 18 November 1995).
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information technology and that were often without legal precedent, placing
them in a grey zone between legal and illegal.48
Major companies developed systems of accounting designed to hide the
extent of their debts. The cumulative impact has been to create vast quan-
tities of debt beyond the oversight of ofﬁcial regulators. Lack of stringent
regulation of the huge international transfers of money facilitated by ﬁnan-
cial globalization ‘has enormously increased the scope and proﬁtability of
transnational organized crime’, one specialist writer has noted.49 Another
has pointed out how criminal markets that were formerly ‘small and iso-
lated’50 have become integrated into the legal economy. Legitimate busi-
ness and criminal enterprise have become difﬁcult to distinguish from each
other as they meet in a legal grey zone.
This exists above all in regard to banking, as both legitimate businesses
and criminal syndicates use similar techniques to move their money around
the world, whether the purpose is primarily to avoid taxes or to hide the
proﬁts of criminal activity. It appears that most of the ‘dirty’ money moved
in this way originates with multinational companies that arrange corporate
locations and business transactions in such a way as to record proﬁts in
low-tax jurisdictions, although these actions may not on the face of it be
illegal. According to the research organization Global Financial Integrity,
‘about 80 per cent of illicit outﬂows’ in recent years have been ‘channe[l]
led through the deliberate misinvoicing of trade’, effectively a process in
which volumes of trade being transacted are falsiﬁed in ofﬁcial documenta-
tion.51 Smaller amounts are deposited by crime barons or corrupt politi-
cians hiding their loot. It is estimated that, between 2002 and 2011,
developing countries lost no less than US$5.9 trillion to illicit ﬁnancial
ﬂows,52 while the ﬁgure now stands at a massive one trillion dollars per
year.53 One group of just 33 sub-Saharan countries is estimated to have lost
a total of $814 billion dollars from 1970 to 2010.54
48. Frank Partnoy, Infectious greed: How deceit and risk corrupted the ﬁnancial markets
(PublicAffairs, New York, NY, 2009).
49. David Beetham, ‘Foreword’, in Felia Allum and Renate Siebert (eds), Organized crime
and the challenge to democracy (Routledge, London and New York, NY, 2003), p. x.
50. R. T. Naylor, Wages of crime: Black markets, illegal ﬁnance, and the underworld economy
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, and London, 2004), p. 3.
51. Dev Kar and Sarah Freitas, Illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows from developing countries: 2001–2010
(Global Financial Integrity, Washington, DC, 2012), p. j.
52. Ibid., p. 13.
53. Raymond Baker, ‘The impact of organized crime on ﬁnance, development, business and
democracy’, workshop on organized crime in Africa held at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation,
Johannesburg, 14 November 2014.
54. James K. Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana, Capital ﬂight from sub-Saharan African coun-
tries: Updated estimates, 1970–2010 (Political Economy Research Institute, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 2012).
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It is in this global context that the contours of states all over the world
have been reshaped, and nowhere has this been more evident than in
Africa, which underwent such extensive economic and political reforms in
the last years of the twentieth century. When political tensions have contrib-
uted to armed conﬂict in Africa, this too has been within a global context
that has changed greatly in recent decades as conventional wars have
become largely obsolete, to be replaced by war among the people.55 In the
1970s, Africa received large quantities of weapons, provided notably by the
Soviet Union as it struggled for control of the Third World, which it hoped
would give it the upper hand in the Cold War.56 The ﬁrst Ronald Reagan
administration (1981–5) contributed to the privatization of war by instigat-
ing a global attack on governments that it considered pro-Soviet, most fam-
ously in Afghanistan and Nicaragua but also in Southern Africa, especially
Angola. Senior ofﬁcials in the USA coordinated an extensive semi-ofﬁcial
network of private funding for arms deliveries to anti-Soviet groups, arran-
ging for one US ally to help another, such as by encouraging wealthy and
pious Saudi citizens to support themujahideen in Afghanistan.
Arrangements of this nature brought intelligence agencies closer than
ever before to major unofﬁcial or even criminal networks in the arms trade
and its associated ﬁnancial circuits, at the same time putting weapons into
the hands of non-ofﬁcial groups in a number of regions. These changes sti-
mulated the emergence of civilian combatant groups funded by illicit
trades, often sponsored by the intelligence services of allied states. As the
Soviet Union disintegrated, governments in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia transformed the international arms market by selling off surplus
Warsaw Pact arsenals at rock-bottom prices.
As a consequence of changes such as these, there now exists a connection
between the types of crime characteristic of a diversity of African states, on
the one hand, and high ﬁnance and big business in rich countries, on the
other hand. Both are associated with the offshore world, used by multi-
national businesses to avoid taxes and to make the payments necessary to
secure contracts as well as by crime bosses laundering their money.57 In
fact, a successful crime boss who has grown wealthy from a criminal trade
in the global South, such as in drugs, may wish to access the facilities of a
developed state on a permanent basis. This is because today’s biggest for-
tunes are made less often from the manufacture or production of physical
55. Rupert Smith, The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world (Penguin, London,
2006).
56. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The world was going our way: The KGB and the
battle for the Third World (Basic Books, New York, NY, 2005), pp. 455–81.
57. Ronen Palan, ‘Crime, sovereignty, and the offshore world’, in H. Richard Friman (ed.),
Crime and the global political economy (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2009),
pp. 35–48.
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commodities than from the promise of future proﬁts, obtained by shaping
markets in such a way as to become a magnet for investors. This is possible
only in an environment where conﬁdence in the future is sustained by
durable institutions, including organs of state, banks, and insurance com-
panies, which permit the inﬁnite generation of credit. African criminal
enterprises – at least those that really count, in terms of either political inﬂu-
ence or scale of proﬁts – almost always have signiﬁcant global linkages, in
respect both to how they conduct illegal commercial activities and how they
invest their money.
Centuries ago plunder and piracy were central to the formation of capital-
ism in Europe.58 In more recent times, non-violent free trade has typically
been conﬁned to the centre of the capitalist system, with violence being
more common on its geographical margins. Illegal markets governed by
private violence raise huge sums for legal investment, and legitimate public
violence and illegitimate private violence often blend into one another.59
With regard to Africa today, this might imply that enterprise crime repre-
sents both a new form of governance and a new style of integration into the
global economy.
State criminal enterprises and organized crime
Changes associated with ﬁnancial globalization put African states under
intense ﬁnancial pressure from the late 1970s onward, to the extent that
many of them turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emer-
gency loans. The response of the IMF and the World Bank was to require
far-reaching economic reforms in the form of structural adjustment pro-
grammes. The expression ‘Washington consensus’ was coined to designate
a range of liberal reforms on which Washington-based ﬁnancial institutions
were broadly agreed,60 with the support of reformers in some other parts of
the world. The hallmark of the Washington consensus was a deliberate
strategy of loosening the control of states over national economies, includ-
ing by eliminating some of the techniques by which states, or those who
governed them, had previously extracted rents from economies that were
often state-run, including by manipulating currencies that were over-
valued. At more or less the same moment, Africa’s dozens of one-party
58. Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, pirates, and sovereigns: State-building and extraterritorial
violence in early modern Europe (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994).
59. Wolfgang Streeck, ‘How will capitalism end?’,New Left Review, 87 (2014), pp. 35–64.
60. John Williamson, ‘What Washington means by policy reform’, in John Williamson (ed.),
Latin American adjustment: How much has happened? (Institute for International Economics,
Washington, DC, 1990), Ch. 2; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents
(W. W. Norton, New York, NY, 2002).
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states found themselves under enormous pressure from within and without
to liberalize their constitutions in order to allow multi-party elections.
Incumbent elites, struggling to preserve their grip on power, were desper-
ate for new sources of income to replace their lost rents, and this became a
powerful stimulus for the coming-together of politicians and state ofﬁcials
with some highly professional criminals. In the 1980s, a number of sover-
eign states came to rely on criminal networks in this way, taking the form of
so-called ‘fusion regimes’,61 and this decade witnessed the conﬁguration of
a nexus of crime and politics in some countries that has existed ever since.
Strong evidence of this process emerged from Sierra Leone, where dia-
monds became a vital source of political ﬁnance,62 but perhaps the most
notorious case in which professional criminals became a source of funding
for politicians is that of Guinea-Bissau. The evidence suggests that key
members of Bissau’s tiny elite sought illicit sources of funding at a time
when established licit forms of accumulation were drying up as structural
adjustment began to bite, and old forms of aid transfer weakened.63 This
was during the years when ‘Nino’ Vieira, the former president who had
gone into exile after losing the civil war of 1998–9, was preparing a come-
back that saw him regain the presidency in 2005. It appears to have been in
this period that he made the acquaintance of some of the Latin American
drug traders who were to enjoy the use of the country’s military facilities
when Vieira duly regained the presidency.64
National and international decision makers were aware of some of these
tendencies and in several countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s they
developed policies intended to counter illicit activities. These efforts,
however, were largely unsuccessful, entailing further implications for the re-
lationship between criminal and state actors. For example, the failure to
stem the cocaine trade in West Africa at a relatively early stage led to a very
rapid expansion of cocaine trafﬁcking in Africa’s coastal states, which in
turn had a wider impact in the Sahel. In Mali, patterns of state protection
for the illicit trade in cocaine (and wider patterns of corruption) compar-
able to the experience of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau occurred in the
context of a decentralization of power in the north. A ‘hollowing out’ of the
61. William Reno, ‘Illicit commerce in peripheral states’, in H. Richard Friman (ed.), Crime
and the global political economy (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2009), pp. 67–84.
62. William Reno, Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995). On the Russian maﬁya in Sierra Leone, see Friedman, Red maﬁya, pp. 57–8.
63. See the chapter on Guinea-Bissau in Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis,
The Elephant in the room: How can peace operations deal with organized crime? (International
Peace Institute, New York, NY, 2013), pp. 17–31.
64. Interview, former senior ofﬁcial of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo
Verde, Accra, 30 October 2013. This was conﬁrmed in interviews in Bissau. See Mark Shaw,
‘Drug trafﬁcking in Guinea-Bissau, 1998–2014: The evolution of an elite protection network’,
Journal of Modern African Studies 53, 3 (2015) (forthcoming).
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Malian state precipitated the coup of 2012 and a prolonged crisis that has
yet to be resolved.65 In some cases, states have effectively lost or renounced
their sovereign monopoly over the use of force and their ability to enforce
contracts, which has then encouraged the emergence of a market for protec-
tion and contract enforcement.
It has been suggested that criminal violence in post-colonial societies typ-
ically ‘does not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit operations of
the market as appropriate their forms… . Its perpetrators create parallel
modes of production and proﬁteering’, thus creating a possibility for ‘vastly
lucrative returns’ in the zone of ambiguity between the presence and the
absence of law.66 This description ﬁts such cases as the warlord militias of
eastern DRC and various other armed groups, which often negotiate with
multinational mining companies for the sale of minerals.67 In this region,
economic activity has been accompanied by violence for decades. If a strict
deﬁnition is applied, we may even describe successive governments of the
DRC as being in effect organized crime groups, with little claim to deﬁne
legality.68 In some cases criminalized militias connected to illicit mining
might have a high degree of support in speciﬁc communities, not least
because they represent the main form of economic activity.
The organization of large-scale violence is not, however, leading to the
emergence of new civic forms of authority that are able to call warlords or
other controllers of military power to account in ways that might parallel the
emergence of accountable states in European history.69 In Nigeria, state
corruption is so extensive that some of the large-scale theft of oil appears to
be the work of state ofﬁcials, or is at least facilitated by them.70 As with
other cases in which the object of criminal activity is to obtain minerals, oil
theft requires the collusion of foreign businesses, including oil shippers and
65. Morten Bøås, ‘Castles in the sand: Informal networks and power brokers in the northern
Mali periphery’, in Mats Utas (ed.), African conﬂicts and informal power: Big men and networks
(Zed Books, London, 2012), pp. 119–34. The French intervention known as Operation Serval
may have had only a limited impact on trafﬁcking. See Global Initiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime, ‘Illicit trafﬁcking and instability in Mali: Past, present and future’ (Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Geneva, January 2014).
66. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, ‘Law and disorder in the postcolony: An introduc-
tion’, in Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (eds), Law and disorder in the postcolony
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2006), p. 5.
67. On the DRC, see Ertuğrul Apakan, ‘Letter dated 2009/11/23 from the Chairman of
the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning
the Democratic Republic of the Congo…’ (S/2009/603, United Nations, New York), <http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/601/43/PDF/N0960143.pdf?> (4 May 2015).
68. Thierry Vircoulon, personal correspondence, 17 November 2014.
69. As argued famously by Charles Tilly, ‘War making and state making as organized crime’,
in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the state back in
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 169–91.
70. Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria’s criminal crude: International options to
combat the export of stolen oil (Chatham House, London, 2013).
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traders and others in the oil business.71 In Kenya, large-scale professional
drug traders have inﬁltrated politics to the extent of forming a distinct bloc
in the national parliament.72
It is evident that crime develops in relation to the state and society with
which it coexists. Thus, South Africa, with a deeply institutionalized state,
is home to crime groups that bear a fairly close resemblance to what a
European or US police ofﬁcer might recognize as organized crime, and
indeed some such groups in South Africa are of foreign origin, although
almost all have developed close relations with some elements of the state.
But in South Africa, too, networked criminal activity occurs over a wide
spectrum, and some aspects of the development of organized crime in this
comparatively advanced economy, such as a growing overlap between the
state, business, and the criminal underworld in the last decade in particular,
already exist elsewhere. A country with a less robust state, such as the DRC,
thus may exhibit a different form of crime, but with some characteristics
common to other countries on the continent.
It seems that in some African countries local groups and networks have
developed into organized crime. Conversely, foreign groups have some-
times been attracted to the continent and have settled there. These two
developments are often interconnected. In both cases the cause is the rapid
emergence of new, global markets that law enforcement agencies have been
unwilling to police, not least because African police forces seldom have the
skills to respond effectively to complex crimes, and in many cases may be
prevented politically from doing so.
The emergence of protection markets
If we are to consider such a wide range of activities as we have mentioned as
constituting the same phenomenon, we need to specify the features they have
in common. Perhaps their most obvious shared feature is the existence of
markets for protection and, hence, of economies of protection. In this section
we develop a sketch of how we might conceptualize markets for protection,
which we believe provides a useful tool for analysing new formations of polit-
ics and crime. The protection economy may be considered as the set of trans-
actions entered into for the purpose of ensuring the facilitation, sustainability
and safety of a set of activities, licit or illicit, undertaken by a criminal enter-
prise. In almost all cases, some elements of the state are involved, and indeed
in African countries, the state (no matter how weak) is often the deﬁning
element in protection markets, either as a direct participant, facilitator, or
71. Ibid.
72. Peter Gastrow, Termites at work: Transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya
(International Peace Institute, New York, NY, 2011).
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regulator. In some cases, businesses may buy the political protection of one or
more senior ofﬁcial and also pay the police directly, in effect turning the police
into a privatized service. In other cases, a criminal enterprise may hire a
legally constituted private security company. In still other cases, an unofﬁcial
militia, whose roots might be in organized crime or in a militarized insur-
gency, provides protection. In every case there exists a market for protection
whose contours can be analysed. It might even be possible to establish market
prices for protection in speciﬁc locations. New entrants into African markets,
particularly if they are illicit ones, usually need to buy protection at very senior
levels of the state in order to ensure their ability to operate without impedi-
ment and to avoid prosecution. Or, if they are operating on a largely regional
level in a situation where the reach of the central authorities is limited, they
may need to secure the alliance of the pre-eminent local powerbroker. The
higher up the scale of political power new entrants go, the greater the transac-
tion costs. Single payments to key powerbrokers are easier to manage than
payments to multiple local gatekeepers and facilitators, and reduce the overall
chance of an effective response from the state.
It must be emphasized that the protection economy is not limited to the
provision of violence or the threat thereof but also includes the ‘ability to
manipulate and exploit social relationships’. In other words, criminal
groups or networks ‘accumulate and employ social capital. Therefore, they
are specialists in violence and, at the same time, experts in social relation-
ships: it means that they are capable of constructing a system grounded on
constraint and of structuring a system of relationships based on variable
forms of social consensus.’73
Thus, transactions to secure the protection of illicit activities by criminal
enterprises fall into three categories along a spectrum, as shown in
Figure 1. The ﬁrst set of transactions in a market for protection concerns
the use or threat of violence, as recruiting people or networks with a cap-
acity for violence is perhaps the most obvious way of ensuring protection.
This is particularly so when moving illegal goods through contested terri-
tory. The actors involved range from street thugs to agents of the state such
as military, police, or intelligence units. In the latter case, buying protection
from state security institutions has important implications, as it leads to in-
ternal competition within the security apparatus and strengthens some
parts over others.
An excellent example is provided by the role of the Zimbabwean military
and intelligence service in diamond mining.74 In some cases, when illicit
73. Rocco Sciarrone, ‘The business of the grey area: Relationships of complicity and collu-
sion in the economic ﬁeld’, in Claudio La Camera (ed.), The grey area of the Ndrangheta
(Aracne, Rome, 2014), p. 81.
74. Global Witness, Financing a parallel government? The involvement of the secret police and
military in Zimbabwe’s diamond, cotton and property sectors (Global Witness, London, 2012).
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accumulation becomes central to the existence of security institutions, in a
state with a declining ability to raise the taxes with which to fund them, se-
curity actors become resistant to cutting themselves off from these sources.
This process seems well under way in Zimbabwe, where the military in-
creasingly relies on illicit sources of funds and is thus less responsive to calls
from political leadership to withdraw from them.75
It has been suggested that what is emerging in such states is a bargain
between political and security/military elites: incumbent politicians close
their eyes to the illicit activities that the security establishment uses to fund
itself, while the security establishment agrees to limit its political interven-
tions in the shape of coups and the like.76 While this may be a sweeping
statement, the general point is that patterns of illicit accumulation by the
military and the security establishment may have a more decisive long-term
impact on civil–military and civil–security relations in African countries
than is currently understood. The role that different African intelligence
services play in respect of the nexus between government, business, and
criminal relationships is in urgent need of analysis.
Figure 1 The political economy of criminal enterprise protection
75. In a recent example, senior military commanders have resisted withdrawing from a large
game concession they had seized, despite a direct request from President Mugabe for them to
do so. Interviews, civil society representatives, Harare, May 2014.
76. Thierry Vircoulon, ‘International Crisis Group presentation to the Development
Dialogue’ (The Hague, International Crisis Group, 9 April 2014).
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The second set of transactions in a market for protection is in the ﬁeld of
facilitation and communication. A criminal entrepreneur seeking protec-
tion may enter into a market transaction for services in this ﬁeld because
corrupting elements of the state in order to ensure the facilitation of illicit
activities is a time-honoured way for people involved in illicit activities to
secure protection. Corruption for this purpose may extend from low-level
pay-offs of police constables and customs ofﬁcers to the bribery of senior
politicians. At the senior level, the relationship between the political leader-
ship and criminal enterprises is often more complex than may be recog-
nized in much of the literature concerning ‘state capture’. It may not
require a politician to engage directly in a criminal enterprise, but simply to
provide the space for such activities to occur in return for payment.
Importantly too, a transaction may involve communicating those connec-
tions to others. For example, in an important Southern African country
that we prefer not to name, a particular private business venture (which
could equally be labelled in relation to some of its activities as a criminal en-
terprise) usually invites the president to its premises once a week for drinks
and entertainment.77 The presidential motorcade arrives and things
proceed. At the same time, other guests or business partners are invited,
not to meet the president but to see that he is present. It is a kind of indirect
transaction to ensure space or protection for the criminal enterprise.78
The third set of transactions that must be taken into account concerns le-
gitimacy. Criminal entrepreneurs may seek legitimacy for their activities by
measures extending from the provision of low-level social and economic
support to families and communities in order to ensure an ability to operate
locally, right up to political party funding. If so, an important implication is
that an investment in investigative journalism or civil society responsiveness
may increase the costs of political facilitation or communication by expos-
ing such links to public scrutiny. In Figure 1, as one moves up the vertical
axis, transaction costs increase, as does the level of engagement with the
state. As suggested here, if a criminal group ﬁnds it necessary to intervene
at the local or community level (for example, to secure local legitimacy),
this may provide an incentive for local communities themselves to engage
in illicit activities.
We believe that studying the market for protection constitutes a simple
but effective analytical tool for four reasons. First, it can be applied to
almost all activities in a diverse range of African states and includes the role
of state actors. It therefore has a wide ambit, providing many points of entry
77. Personal communication, investigative journalists working on the story, April 2014.
78. Important work conducted outside of Africa is helpful to understanding these forms of
communication and facilitation. See Diego Gambetta, Codes of the underworld: How criminals
communicate (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011).
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for journalists or other investigators. Second, it takes into account the role
of diverse internal and external actors, and seeks to understand the often
complex nature of the interface between them, including the role of state
and security institutions as key gatekeepers for some forms of criminal ac-
tivity. Third, analytical work on the protection economy can provide price
indications for protection as an essential good or commodity in its own
right. Fourth, it means that if the price for protection can be raised, it may
improve the prospects for changing the calculus for criminal enterprises.
Organized crime and state formation
The development of protection economies is a much more complex ar-
rangement than the seeking of rents by political or security elites to allow
illegal activities. Any cogent analysis requires taking into account the total-
ity of any given network and the associated transactions for protection need
to be analysed with due regard for the political, economic and social context
in which they occur. It is arguable that some such networks could in time
become stable and develop an ability to reproduce themselves, making
them possible precursors of state formations of the future.79 This brings to
mind a well-known argument made by the sociologist Charles Tilly, who,
describing the precursors of Europe’s modern states in early modern times,
famously described how war making came to require larger and more efﬁ-
cient armies in an age when wars were generally associated with the urge to
capture treasure, booty, and territory from a rival. The necessity to organize
larger, better-armed, and more effective armies in turn created a need for
princes to acquire a regular income in the form of taxation, which then
required a higher degree of bureaucratic efﬁciency than had previously
existed. This created a self-reinforcing logic that drove state development.
In his own formulation, ‘war made the state and the state made war’.80
However, the differences between twenty-ﬁrst century Africa and early
modern Europe are more striking than the similarities. Every major
European country had a long tradition of centralized government accom-
panied by some degree of bureaucratic capacity even before the military
developments associated with the age of gunpowder. In some countries,
such as England, medieval kings had developed a quite extensive machinery
of government and taxation. It is true that some African countries, such as
Rwanda, also have a history of centralized government that makes a com-
parison with early modern Europe viable, and it is possible that in such
cases the type of militarized and systematic plunder that the Rwandan
79. Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs.
80. Charles Tilly, The formation of national states in Western Europe (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975), pp. 299–300.
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government has sponsored in DRC could indeed lead over time to the for-
mation of a stronger and more formidable Rwandan state. But in the major-
ity of cases this seems unlikely as the logic of war and the ﬁnancing of war
are leading not to the development of more extensive and better organized
civil services, but rather to an informalization of power whereby rulers
prefer personal client systems to impersonal bureaucracies. In other words,
capturing the resource ﬂows generated or conveyed by organized crime is
leading to the formation of what have memorably been called ‘successful
failed states’.81
Thus, the speculation that organized crime “buys power” in a simple
transactional arrangement – with the implication that this may destroy
certain states in Africa, as sometimes suggested by the United Nations82 –
is open to doubt. Whether the presence of organized crime is a stimulus to
violent conﬂict seems to vary from case to case, according to whether the
resulting ﬂows of money and inﬂuence are retained by the head of state or
the group in power (for example, in Zimbabwe) or whether they are cap-
tured by provincial warlords or militias, as in Mali and Libya.
Conclusion
How then can we answer the question posed by the title of this article?
Organized crime exists in Africa, but it is increasingly taking a form that dis-
qualiﬁes the term ‘organized crime’, which generally does not take into
account the degree to which criminal activities constitute a nexus between a
ﬂuid state and political, economic, and social actors. In our view these
interactions are themselves redeﬁning the nature of the state,83 and the ter-
minology of organized crime seems inappropriate to signify this, originating
as this vocabulary does in a more limited Western discussion of law break-
ing. The notion of criminal enterprises captures more accurately (although
still imperfectly) a set of interactions between key members of elites in a
speciﬁc location. It implies a focus on the nexus of exchanges at the very
heights of the state, society, and economy, rather than a narrower discus-
sion around organized gangs in any African city engaged in more minor
crimes like car theft or low-level fraud. The latter may be organized crime,
81. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and politics in the Gulf of Guinea (Hurst and Co., London,
2007), pp. 20–1. The phrase ‘successful failed state’ seems to have been invented by Gérard
Prunier and Rachel Gisselquist.
82. United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, ‘Organized crime and its threat to security:
Tackling a disturbing consequence of drug control’ (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 11–20
March 2008, Vienna; and Commission on Crime Prevention, 16–24 April 2009, Vienna), p. 4.
83. For recent observations along lines similar to these, see Louise I. Shelley, Dirty entangle-
ments: Corruption, crime, and terrorism (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2014);
and Francesco Strazzari, ‘Captured or capturing? Narcotics and political instability along the
“African route” to Europe’, European Review of Organised Crime 1, 2 (2014), pp. 5–34.
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and indeed often has some lower-level linkage to ofﬁcial actors, but it is not
an enterprise we consider to be at the heart of the changing nature of the
African state. The role of the state in a speciﬁc criminal enterprise and the
degree to which resources for the public good are syphoned off into private
hands or to meet private objectives are deﬁning aspects of enterprise crime.
Enterprise crime therefore often has elements of corruption, another term
that does scant justice to the complex economic, political, and social trans-
actions involved.
Understanding the meaning in African contexts of the type of large-scale,
political-criminal entrepreneurship that we have evoked will increasingly
drive both internal and external policy discussions, as these become direc-
ted to ﬁnding remedies. What is clear, given the complex phenomenon that
we have outlined, is that law enforcement interventions alone will do little
to make a difference. A discussion is emerging as to how to develop more
effective political responses in this sector, the best example being the high-
proﬁle West African Commission on Drugs, but also how initiatives aimed
at development can have greater impact on high-level criminality.
While there is still a long way to go on this score, understanding in detail
the transaction costs of protection is a key analytical tool that can aid policy
makers to understand where development interventions may take place and
how they may be aligned with other interventions in a more strategic way
than occurs at present. In this regard, the key function of development
interventions must be to change the incentive structures that make these
transactions possible. Indeed, this may be all that development interven-
tions are able to do.
As we have tried to demonstrate, markets for protection are the nexus
between business, crime, and politics. The existence of a high-level agree-
ment on protection that draws in actors from all three sectors – business,
crime, politics – at the apex of societies is often connected to lower-level
entrepreneurs of violence, who constitute the foot soldiers of protection
enforcers. Analysis of protection economies, as well as helping us trace the
contours of the politics/business/crime nexus in individual countries and
regions, may also have the advantage of allowing comparison between dif-
ferent African cases.
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